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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
Collectively, millions of dollars are at stake.139 Moreover, when-
ever a choice of venue is possible, a conflict arises between the cred-
itor, seeking a 7.5 percent forum and parity with existing interest rates,
and the debtor, already beset with financial burdens, adamantly re-
sisting said forum via a motion for a change of venue.-40
Rachlin represents the first appellate pronouncement on whether
the interest rate under article 50 has been increased by the action of
the Banking Board. Based on the soundness of the decisions thus far,
it is improbable that any one approach can be considered the correct
one.141 Hence, it is conceivable that without prompt legislative ac-
tion, the conflict will merely be transposed onto the appellate level
rather than resolved.
CPLR 5015: Default judgments vacated sua sponte.
CPLR 5015 provides that the "court which rendered a judgment
... may relieve a party... upon such terms as may be just, on mo-
tion of an interested person." Does the phrase "interested person"
allow for a motion by the court itself? In Ail-State Credit v. Riess142
this question was answered in the affirmative. There, the appellate
term affirmed a Nassau County District Court's sua sponte vacatur
of default judgments and the underlying complaints in 669 actions
which had been consolidated.
The actions were based on various retail installment contracts.
None of the defendants were residents of Nassau County, nor were
they served with process there. Instead, jurisdiction was predicated
upon the long-arm provision of the UDCA.143 Since personal service
had not been effected, and the plaintiff failed to include the requisite
allegation concerning the basis for jurisdiction, the court concluded
that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants. 144
Although the Al-State decision ostensibly exceeds a court's ex-
press power under CPLR 5015, it is justifiable in view of a court's
inherent authority to vacate judgments.145 Indeed, it would be an ab-
139 See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR, commentary at 132-34 (1969).
140 CPLR 511(a).
141 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5004, commentary at 132-34 (1969).
142 61 Misc. 2d 677, 306 N.Y.S.2d 596 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1970).
143 UDCA § 404(a)(1) & (b).
144 Cf. Coffman v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 60 Misc. 2d 81, 302 N.Y.S.2d 480
(Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1969).
145 CPLR 5015 contains five grounds for relief: (1) excusable default; (2) newly dis-
covered evidence; (3) fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adversary; (4)
lack of jurisdiction, and (5) reversal, modification or vacatur of a prior judgment or order.
Nevertheless, courts have consistently opined that these grounds are not exclusive. Rather,
the court's power is inherent. Ladd v. Stevenson, 112 N.Y. 325, 19 N.E. 842 (1889). See also
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surdity to maintain that a court cannot remedy an essential defect
that it has recognized. Moreover, some time in the future, the de-
faults would be subject to motions to vacate - 669 to be exactl Thus,
in the interest of judicial economy, the decision is warranted. And,
while undoubtedly motivated by a concern for the consumer, the
All-State rationale will, hopefully, be adopted in other areas.
CPLR 5226: Public welfare recipient not exempt from installment
payment order.
CPLR 5226 provides that "[w]here it is shown that the judgment
debtor is receiving or will receive money from any source, or is at-
tempting to impede the judgment creditor by rendering services with-
out adequate compensation . . . " the judgment creditor may move
for an installment payment order directing the judgment debtor to
make certain specified payments periodically in satisfaction of the
judgment against him. Thus, the judgment creditor is afforded some
recourse against his debtor's "invisible" means of support.146 And,
unlike an income execution, 147 the installment payment order con-
tains no monetary limitations. 148
In Prior v. Cunningham,149 the defendant attempted to counter
a motion for an installment payment order by arguing that sections
137150 and 137-a' 51 of the Social Services Law evidenced a legislative
intent to exempt recipients of public assistance from the ambit of
CPLR 5226. Nonetheless, the Appellate Division, Third Department,
held that these exemptions only applied to those funds which were
specifically enumerated, and, therefore, should not be interpreted as
exempting recipients of public welfare assistance from every levy and
execution.152
If a judgment debtor has a hidden source of income, there is no
reason why the fact that he is also receiving public assistance should
preclude the issuance of an installment payment order if the court
finds that he can afford it.'5 In such circumstances, it is likely that
7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 5015, commentary at 580 (1963); Tmm REP. 204; 5 WK&M
5015.12.
146 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 5226, commentary at 112 (1963).
147 CPLR 5231(e).
148 Under CPLR 5205(e), the income execution is good only up to 10 percent of the
judgment debtor's income.
14933 App. Div. 2d 853, 306 N.Y.S.2d 22 (3d Dep't 1969).
150 N.Y. Soc. SERViCES LAW § 137 (McKinney 1941).
151 N.Y. Soc. SERvicEs LAW § 137-a (McKinney supp. 1968).
15233 App. Div. 2d at 853, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 23.
I58 CPLR 5226 provides that:
In fixing the amount of the payments, the court shall take into consideration the
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